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Abstract
Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the
workforce is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redis-
tribution levels that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional
representation systems (Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mis-
take. We explain the mistake and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the
original paper continues to hold.
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Austen-Smith (2000) reports a theoretical result that if the cost of entering the workforce
is sufficiently low, winner-take-all political systems induce endogenous redistribution levels
that are systematically lower than those determined by proportional representation systems
(Proposition 6). The proof in Austen-Smith (2000) has a mistake. We explain the mistake
and offer an alternative proof. The conclusion of the original paper continues to hold.
1 The problem
This section explains the mistake in the original paper. Before doing that, we review the
modelling assumptions and results that are affected by the mistake. We refer to the original
paper for a careful and exhaustive description of the model and do not report it here.
The main result of the paper (Proposition 6) shows that winner-take-all systems are
associated to lower redistribution than proportional representation ones. The tax rate im-
plemented under winner-take-all systems, tl(θm), is assumed to be the one preferred by the
median type θm (under the assumption that this type is an employee). Under proportional
representation systems, the tax rate is decided through a legislative bargaining process. The
implemented rate, tL, is the one maximizing the utility of the average employee. More pre-
cisely, tL is the only PRPE-stable level of taxation (i.e. the only tax level such that, if the
status quo is t0 = tL, the legislative bargaining process will select tL as an outcome). This
is shown in Proposition 4. The proof of the proposition is a direct consequence of Lemma 3.
In turn, the lemma relies on the conclusion that tE < tL < tD, where tE and tD are the tax
levels maximizing the average employers’ and unemployed individuals’ utilities, respectively.
In order to obtain well defined tax levels, the paper relies on single-peakedness of in-
dividuals’ preferences. In particular, Lemma 2 and Proposition 2 show that employees’
and unemployed individuals’ net income is strictly concave in t, while employers’ net in-
come is strictly quasi-concave in the tax level. Furthermore, Proposition 2 establishes that
te(θ) ≤ tl(θ) ≤ td(θ) (where tj(θ) denotes the optimal tax rate for a type θ in occupation
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j ∈ {e, l, d}) and that, for each occupation, the preferred tax level is (weakly) decreasing
in type. This has two important implications for the results in the paper: first, it allows
one to apply the median voter theorem and conclude that the implemented tax rate under
winner-take-all systems is tl(θm). Secondly, it implies that tE < tL < tD, opening the way to
the results for proportional representation.
The argument showing quasi-concavity of employers’ income, however, contains a mis-
take. Let ye(·, θ) denote the gross income of an employer of type θ. The second derivative
of employers’ net income with respect to the tax rate t is
d2xe(t,θ)
dt2
= b′′(t)− (1− t)y′′e (·, θ) + 2y′e(·, θ)
= b′′(t)− (1− t)[(w∗t )2Lw(w∗, θ) + w∗ttL(w∗, θ)] + 2w∗tL(w∗, θ)
The first term is the second derivative of the benefits with respect to t and is always negative
(Lemma 2). In the second and third terms of the last line, w∗t and w
∗
tt are the first and second
derivatives of the equilibrium wage with respect to t, L(w∗, θ) is the optimal amount of labor
demanded by an employer of type θ and Lw(w
∗, θ) is its derivative with respect to the wage
rate. The author shows that
lim
θ↓0
d2xe(t, θ)
dt2
= b′′(t) < 0
Then, proving that
d
dθ
[
d2xe(t, θ)
dt2
]
≤ 0
is enough to obtain the result. This third derivative can be obtained by directly differentiat-
ing d2xe(t, θ)/dt
2 with respect to θ or, as done in the paper, by differentiating d2xe(t, θ)/dtdθ
with respect to t and using Young’s theorem. We have
d2xe(t, θ)
dtdθ
= −(1− t)(w∗t )2Lθ(w∗, θ)− Fθ(L(w∗, θ), θ) < 0
where F (L, θ) is the production function of an employer of type θ that employees L units of
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labor and Fθ(·) represents its derivative with respect to the second argument. The author
writes
d
dt
[
d2xe(t, θ)
dtdθ
]
= −Lθ(w∗, θ)[2w∗t + (1− t)w∗tt]− (1− t)(w∗t )2Lθw(w∗, θ) (1)
The assumptions made on the production function ensure that Lθw(w
∗, θ) > 0. Denoting by
˜(t) the tax elasticity of the marginal equilibrium wage rate,
˜(t) =
t
w∗t
w∗tt
the author assumes (first inequality in condition (5) in the paper)
−2t ≤ (1− t)˜(t) (2)
This is equivalent to assuming that the term in square brackets in (1) is positive. Since
L(w∗, θ) is increasing in θ, condition (2) is enough to ensure that (1) is negative. Equation
(1), however, is wrong. The correct version should be
d
dt
[
d2xe(t, θ)
dtdθ
]
= Lθ(w
∗, θ)[2w∗t − (1− t)w∗tt]− (1− t)(w∗t )2Lθw(w∗, θ)
This implies that condition (2) cannot be used to establish the result, leaving the question
of quasi-concavity unanswered.
In sum, the mistake implies that single-peakedness does not necessarily hold, and hence
the results based on median voter utilities can be questioned. Fortunately, we now show
that there is an alternative way to justify using median voter utilities.
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2 An Alternative Proof
In this section, we provide an alternative proof of the results. In the following lemma,
we show that agents’ preferences satisfy a weaker version of the single-crossing property
(Gans and Smart (1996)). As in the original paper, let ξ(t, θ) denote a type θ’s maximum
consumption level conditional on a tax rate t and sorting equilibrium w∗ = w∗(t).
Lemma 1. For any two tax levels t, t′ such that t < t′,
1. ξ(t, θm) ≥ ξ(t′, θm)⇒ ξ(t, θ) ≥ ξ(t′, θ) for all θ > θm
2. ξ(t′, θm) ≥ ξ(t, θm)⇒ ξ(t′, θ) ≥ ξ(t, θ) for all θ < θm
Proof. Let θ > θm first. A sufficient condition for 1. to hold is
ξ(t, θ)− ξ(t′, θ) ≥ ξ(t, θm)− ξ(t′, θm)
for all t < t′. Rearranging terms, we get
ξ(t, θ)− ξ(t, θm) ≥ ξ(t′, θ)− ξ(t′, θm)
Thus, 1. holds if the function ∆ξ(t) ≡ ξ(t, θ) − ξ(t, θm) is decreasing in t. By assumption,
the median type is an employee, so that ξ(t, θm) = xl(t, θm). For all θ ∈ (θm, θ2(t, w∗)),
ξ(t, θ) = xl(t, θ). Then, ∆ξ(t) = (1 − t)(θ − θm)w∗. Differentiating it with respect to t and
rearranging terms, we get
d∆ξ(t)
dt
= −(θ − θm)w∗V (t)
where
V (t) ≡ 1− (1− t)
w∗
dw∗
dt
> 0
as shown in the proof of Lemma 2 in the original paper. For all θ ∈ [θ2, θ¯), ξ(t, θ) = xe(t, θ).
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Then, ∆ξ(t) = (1− t)[ye(t, θ)− w∗θm] and
d∆ξ(t)
dt
= −[ye(t, θ)− w∗θm] + (1− t)
[
dye(t, θ)
dt
− θmdw
∗
dt
]
By the envelope theorem,
dye(t, θ)
dt
= −L(w∗, θ)dw
∗
dt
Then,
d∆ξ(t)
dt
= −[ye(t, θ)− w∗θm]− (1− t) [L(w∗, θ) + θm] dw
∗
dt
< 0
as gross income is increasing in θ and wage is increasing in t.
By a similar reasoning, a sufficient condition for 2. to hold is d∆ξ(t)/dt > 0, whenever
θ < θm. For all θ ∈ [θ1(t, w∗), θm), ξ(t, θ) = xl(t, θ) and ∆ξ(t) = (1 − t)(θ − θm)w∗. For
all types θ ∈ (0, θ1(t, w∗)), ξ(t, θ) = xd(t, θ) and ∆ξ(t) = −(1 − t)θmw∗ + c. In both cases,
V (t) > 0 implies d∆ξ(t)/dt > 0.
By Lemma 1, the implemented tax level under the winner-take-all system will be the one
preferred by the median voter, tl(θm).
Consider the legislative bargaining process taking place under the proportional represen-
tation system. The existence of a tE maximizing the average employers’ utility is ensured by
the fact that the utility function is continuous and t ∈ [0, 1]. The problem is that, without
single-peakedness, one cannot establish that tE is i) unique and ii) such that tE < tL < tD.
As a matter of fact, this is not necessary to prove the main result. Whenever, the party
of the employers proposes tE such that tL < tE < tD, Lemma 3 and Proposition 4 im-
ply that the only PRPE-stable level of taxation is tE . Then, Proposition 6 ensures that
tl(θm) < tL < tE . An identical reasoning holds for the case in which tL < tD < tE . Then, the
tax level implemented under proportional representation systems will still be higher than
the one implemented under winner-take-all.
As a final remark, notice that, given our alternative proof of the results, the lower bound
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of assumption (5) in the paper is no longer necessary.1
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